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
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MOTIVATION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN THE
UNITED STATES NAVY

IRA E. HORBS
CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY



MOTIVATION OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL
IN THE
UNITED STATES NAVY

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
AND
THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDY
OF
LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE
OF
MASTER OF ARTS

BY
IRA E. HOBBS
CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY
AUGUST, 1947

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I am deeply grateful to my faculty adviser, Dr. Paul A. Jones, Dean of Men at Santa Barbara College, for his suggestions and technical assistance.

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PREFACE

This thesis is an analysis and critique of the techniques used in the U. S. Navy for motivation of enlisted personnel. The writer does not claim to be qualified to give solutions to the many phases of this intriguing problem, but does bring more than two decades of experience and one year of study of Navy department published and unpublished material, educational, psychological and business publications, and opinions of experienced Naval Officers along this line, to bear upon it. Three different, but somewhat related phases will be analyzed:

1. Basic psychological requirements for motivation.
2. Discipline as a motivating factor.
3. Competition as a means of motivation.

Much has been written, both in the Navy and out, upon the subject of motivation, but to the writer's knowledge no single publication exists that adequately covers this subject as applicable to Navy personnel. Many of these reference books contain platitudes such as "keep smiling", "work hard", "be tactful", etc., while other books give technical psychological dissertations upon patterns of human behavior. The writer is convinced that there is no one answer, right or wrong, to the many problems that exist in the field of motivation. Rather,

there are some basic assumptions that should be understood and appreciated and used when applicable.

The mission of this thesis is not to cover the field of emotional leadership based upon the lives of outstanding naval officers or successful businessmen, but to present, analyze, and criticize objectively the techniques that may be used to gain and maintain the interest of enlisted personnel. While no radical changes are recommended, some suggestions are made which are believed to be of value to the Navy. The reader may not agree, or, he may have better solutions to the problem than those given in this thesis. However, it is hoped that this paper will bring to the attention of all officers and candidate officers the significance and the need for improvement of motivation in the field of personnel administration.

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CHAPTER I

BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MOTIVATION

Introduction

In the past one hundred and fifty years the world has passed through an industrial revolution. Mass production methods have changed man's way of living from that of the individual craftsman with a source of work satisfaction to that of a machine operator where a lack of intelligence is sometimes an asset instead of a liability. Groups of anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists have spent years and millions of dollars on elaborate expeditions to the south sea islands to observe, analyze and report on various facets of primitive tribal life; while, at the same time, they have neglected one of the most fruitful sources of study -- the behavior of men who are performing monotonous and repetitious tasks on an assembly line behind brick walls.

During the same period our Navy has passed through a similar transformation from iron men and wooden ships to skilled technicians and ships or planes that are feats of engineering skill. The old seaman had a sense of achievement when reefing a topsail during a blow; but, does our modern sailor feel the same way about reading a battery of precision gauges and recording the results in a log? Are we naval offi-

cers making an error of omission similar to the social scientists' in depending too much on emotional leadership obtained by reading such books as "A Message to Garcia," rather than analyzing and utilizing basic psychological factors governing human behavior?

Motivating personnel is an aspect of the larger problem of managing personnel. Since it concerns itself exclusively with human behavior, about which there is still much to be learned, any treatment of the study of motivating personnel is likely to be indefinite and based upon opinions rather than on careful scientific research. Yet there is sufficient material available to remove this problem from the realm of meta-physical garbling, so common to leadership lectures, and reduce it to a few general principles which will permit a functional approach.

The subject of motivation is approaching the status of a separate field in psychology with its own methods, principles, and techniques. There are many definitions for the word. Skinner defines motivation as: ". . . any situation in which the object is to arouse interest and action according to a goal or objective."¹ For the purposes of this paper, the writer prefers to define motivation as the objective to gain and maintain interest in the Navy on the part of all hands.

There are a number of techniques that have been used for motivation of Navy personnel. These have been tested through generations of naval leadership and have proved highly

¹Charles E. Skinner (ed.), Educational Psychology (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), p. 194.

satisfactory. The problem frequently lies not so much in knowing what they are as in deciding which one to employ and when. These principles will be presented in as meaningful a manner as possible in order that they may be used by officers and candidate officers for motivation as a technique of personnel administration.

Desires for Recognition and Security

As a group, psychologists differ on many aspects in the field of psychology. They are divided into various schools, usually founded upon a theory developed by an eminent member. There is even considerable difference of opinion in each group as to terminology and definitions used in descriptions of basic theories accepted by the school. However, all psychologists appear to agree on two of the fundamental drives that motivate men's actions when such basic drives as fear, hunger, love, and sex are satisfied. These are the desires for recognition and for security. These drives are always present, but seldom satisfied, in all men from early childhood to the grave.

One of the most significant surveys ever made in the field of human relationships is "The Hawthorne Studies".² This study was carried on in Western Electric Company's plant at Hawthorne, Illinois, over a period of sixteen years, from 1924 to 1940. The original purpose of the experiments was to find out the relation of the quality and quantity of illumination to the efficiency of industrial workers. The early results obtained were so contradictory and startling that other institu-

²F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Management and the Worker, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.)

tions such as the Harvard Business School, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, became interested in the work. Books have been written covering certain aspects of the experiments.

In one experiment the workers were divided into two isolated groups for winding induction coils. One group, the control group, was to work under a constant intensity of illumination while the other, the experimental group, was to work under a varying intensity of light. Careful and scientific preparations were made to measure the quality and quantity of work turned out. The illumination was increased for the "experimental group" and production increased. Illumination was decreased and production increased. Then the startling discovery was made that not only had the experimental group increased production to a marked extent, but so had the control group. The experiment to determine the effectiveness of illumination upon production was a failure, but one thing was certain; a new, unknown factor had been introduced with increased production in both groups.

Additional experiments were made in segregated groups of workers, and various factors of working conditions were changed. Hours of work were decreased, additional rest periods given, hot lunches served, and hours of work increased; but almost invariably production was upped. The reason for this increased production finally determined by the researchers was the attitude of the workers. The workers had come to feel important during these experiments and felt that the work they

were doing was important.

The significant point of these studies is summed up by Stuart Chase who stated:

For their neglect of the human function of production, managers have paid a high price in strikes, restricted output, revolts, and a vast sea of human waste. They have not realized that an age-old way of life has been destroyed, and that something equally binding must be put in its place or the machine age will ultimately smash up.

The best insurance against the totalitarian danger, we are told, is to 'make democracy work.' To some, this means only obtaining a high industrial output and military efficiency. To others, it means giving plain citizens new satisfaction and a new spirit, making each one feel deeply that he counts. The discoveries at Hawthorne suggested that both results can be achieved by one and the same method. They apply to little factories as well as to large.....³ There is an idea here so big that it leaves one gasping.

The results of the Hawthorne studies have been so amazing that they lead one to believe there is probably no field in the art of motivation with such wide possibilities for improvement as the work of instilling a sense of security and recognition in Navy men of lower ranks. Some officers accomplish this feat deliberately, others unconsciously, while a few officers fail to recognize the problem. The importance of recognizing the problem of establishing a sense of security and a sense of recognition is considered so essential to motivation that each of these items will be discussed separately.

Desire for Recognition

The desire for recognition exists in all individuals. The admiral wants recognition just as much as the seaman second

³Stuart Chase, Men at Work, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1945), p. 27.

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class. The probable reason that so many officers of high rank tend to tell "sea stories" based upon their own experiences is that few dare to pat them on the back, or those who do have selfish reasons, compelling the officers to do their own praising in order to satisfy a desire for recognition.

In developing the subject of the desire for recognition it is possible to set down a general principle upon which to base one important technique of motivation:

"Every officer should act in such a way that each contact with an enlisted man makes that man feel important and makes him feel that what he is doing is important."

There are few of us who do not get a glow of satisfaction when receiving the Navy's classical expression of, "well done," particularly if it comes from one who uses the phrase sparingly. Excessive praise can be overdone and develop conceit or the "prima donna" attitude in men or in a unit, which cannot be tolerated in a military organization. Too much praise also has the possibility of losing its power as a stimulant in motivating men to do routine work. Praise should be reserved for men who accomplish tasks above and beyond the normal call of duty. On the other hand, in the development of a sense of achievement it is considered more desirable to give too much praise to individuals rather than not enough.

Everyone recognizes the importance of personal problems in dealing with men. In the Hawthorne Studies⁴ it was found that standardized questions for interviewing workers were

⁴Roethlisberger and Dickson, op. cit., pp. 223 - 226.

not satisfactory as many workers were affected by what seemed to the interviewers insignificant problems. Most of the problems were not important to the company, but they were important to the individuals. When the interviewer took an interest in the worker's problems, his efforts resulted in considerable therapeutic value to the worker and indirect assistance to the company.

Probably one of the greatest fields of improvement for developing a sense of recognition of men in the Navy is the use of names instead of numbers. No one likes to be addressed as "hey you," and sometimes with added sarcasm, "with the hat on the back of your head." A naval officer should pride himself upon knowing the name of every man in his division and as much about each man's personal history as possible. A reference to a man's family or to his home state makes him feel important and shows that his officers are interested in him. Many men feel that it is more important to be known unfavorably than not to be known at all. This is one of the reasons why some men are disciplinary problems; they are unable to gain status by favorable recognition and resort to infractions of regulations to gain recognition of one kind or another.

For a man to gain a sense of recognition the three following conditions must be fulfilled:

1. He must feel important to himself.
2. He must feel important to his associates.
3. He must feel important to his superiors.

Practically every study on record of employees' grievances has put wages all the way from sixth to fifteenth

in importance to the worker,⁵ while sense of recognition varies from one to four in importance. Although money received in promotion in the Navy is no small factor, it is not as important as the prestige and status that go with the rank or rate. Some officers will remember the promotion from plebe to third classman as the biggest promotion received in the Navy. There was no increase in pay, but a marked difference in status.

It is not easy for officers to make men feel that they are genuinely important to the Navy. The men must be made to feel for certain:

1. That the officer is interested in their welfare.
2. That the officer would go out of his way to help them.
3. That the officer has confidence the men are able to do their jobs.

During a visit to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in San Diego, an experienced marine officer was asked for an explanation of the famous marine esprit de corps. While this officer was not a trained psychologist, it was apparent that he knew men, and furthermore the Marine Corps was an obsession with him. His oral reply is summarized as follows:

The marine esprit de corps is definitely instilled in the individual during the training at the Recruit Depot. As soon as a newly enlisted man reports to the Recruit Depot, he is given a military haircut and assigned to a platoon along with about sixty other recruits. Three

⁵W. R. Spriegel, Principles of Business Organization, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), p. 435.

or four experienced sergeants are detailed to each platoon as instructors in order that each trainee can be given expert individual training. The instructors are carefully selected for this duty and serve not only as teachers but as father confessors. These Drill Instructors are tough on the men but are always glad to give special instruction to backward recruits as well as to aid them in solving personal problems. In addition, the instructors are expected to be models of neatness, military bearing, and efficiency. In other words, they set themselves up as models after which the new marines can pattern themselves.

During the first three weeks the recruit goes through an extremely rigorous training schedule. No liberty is given, and the man is kept so busy that he has no time to catch up with himself. Not only is the recruit hardened physically and taught the fundamentals of the military profession, but he begins to be instilled with the traditional mental outlook of a marine. In all of the training activities, the Drill Instructors constantly remind the recruits that the marines are the finest marksmen, that they have the best combat record in the world, and that marines can do any job assigned to them. Exploits of famous marines are described to the new men. The object of this phase of the training is not primarily to teach the recruits Marine Corps history, but to make the new marines desire to live up to the standards of the organization and to emulate the deeds of former and present marines. The Drill Instructors repeatedly tell the trainee that if he can successfully complete his training, he can do anything that other marines are capable of doing. Discipline is extremely rigid, and at the end of three weeks' time the recruit has had about all that he can stand.

Then the recruit is taken to the rifle range where the discipline is relaxed somewhat. During the three weeks on the range he fires all the basic weapons which are used by the Marine Corps. Greatest emphasis is placed on rifle marksmanship, and much effort is made to have each man qualify with his primary weapon. The best rifle shots in the Marine Corps are detailed as coaches for the recruits. They use all their skill, knowledge, and patience to have each trainee assigned to them qualify with the rifle. A recruit is instructed by the same coach for the entire time that he is on the range, thereby insuring that each man gets not only individual, but also personalized attention.

The process of establishing the Marine Corps attitude in each recruit is continued during this training. His coach describes the shooting feats of the best riflemen in the Marine Corps in matches and in combat. The recruit has the satisfaction of having one of these famous shots

personally instruct him in shooting lore. These coaches continuously tell the trainee that he too can become a Distinguished Marksman if he follows their directions. The success of the training on the rifle range is demonstrated by the fact that approximately ninety percent of the recruits qualify as Expert Rifleman, Sharpshooter, or Marksman. Each man who qualifies is presented a badge to wear on his uniform which denotes his level of ability as a rifle shot. While at the range, the recruit is given guard duty with certain responsibilities and authority. He is told that he is superior to soldiers and sailors, and by this time he starts to believe that he is. The recruit is made to feel that he is important and that his job is important.

The recruit is then brought back to the Recruit Depot from the rifle range, and for the last four weeks of training he is made to live up to his new sense of importance which has been attained during his primary training. If a recruit is negligent in a duty or breaks a rule, it is usually sufficient for one of his superiors to say, 'Marines do not do this type of thing, and you are a marine as you have demonstrated in successfully completing the recruit training up to this point.'

The writer is convinced that if the Marine Corps has an esprit de corps superior to the Army or the Navy, it is due primarily to the feeling of personal importance and job importance that marines obtain during their recruit training.

Every billet in the Navy is important. Under no circumstances should an officer give any indication that he feels he is assigning an unimportant task to a man. On the positive side this means he must insure that each man knows:

1. If he fails to do his job properly, the safety of his ship and shipmates will be jeopardized.
2. That the crew depends upon him to do his job well.
3. That his efforts, however far removed from the guns, are just as important as firing the guns.

Much more could be written on the importance of making each man feel important as a basic psychological requirement for motivation. Rather, the general principle of this theme will be repeated:

"Every officer should act in such a way that each contact with an enlisted man makes that man feel important and makes him feel that what he is doing is important."

Desire for Security

The desire for security is present in all who wish to survive. It has wide implications. The coxswain of the captain's gig is usually as much concerned about keeping his rate as the captain is in maintaining his rank. The desire for security is present at all levels in all persons.

In developing the topic of desire for security, a second general principle will be advanced as a base for various techniques of motivation:

"Every officer should act in such a way that each contact he has with an enlisted man increases that man's sense of security."

Again referring to the "Hawthorne Studies"⁶, when it became necessary to discontinue these experiments during the depression, a large number of the workers were laid off. One would imagine that during this period of uncertainty the workers would be exerting every effort to increase production in order to keep their jobs. This was not the case, as production

⁶Roethlisberger and Dickson, op. cit., p. 247.

actually fell off due to the feeling of insecurity, anxiety, and worry among the workers.

In developing a feeling of security, one should recognize that two types of security are involved: Security in the present, and security in the future. The men must feel, moreover, that whatever is in store for them will be for their best interests and welfare.

Present security. - When a man reports aboard ship or a new station, or when there is a change in command, he usually feels insecure. It is not the strictness with which the rules and regulations are enforced that bothers him, but rather it is not knowing the rules and regulations, not knowing what actions are expected of him, or not knowing what are his rights, that will confuse him and lead to insecurity.

As a whole, industry goes to considerable trouble and expense to make new workers feel secure. This begins with a member from the personnel office escorting the worker to the job and introducing him to his boss and fellow workers. There, usually, is another worker appointed as his guide until he becomes oriented.

Officers would do well to consider the emotional impact and sense of insecurity that exists when new recruits report aboard, and realize the necessity for making them feel secure before starting their new assignments. A short period of orientation under the supervision of an experienced petty officer should be given new men reporting aboard. Ship's Orders, Ship's Organization Book, Watch-Quarter-and Station

Bill, and other organizational features should be carefully explained to them. If practicable, short tours through various parts of the ship should be made. Such actions will not only make the new men feel more secure aboard ship, but will make them feel that they "belong" to the Navy.

There is one grave danger that must be avoided in the attempt to give men a feeling of security. No man must be led to feel that regardless of what he does nothing will happen to him. Rather, he should realize that as long as he does his work properly, obeys the rules, and carries out regulations, his security is assured.

For men to develop a sense of security it is essential they feel at all times that they are being treated justly, fairly, and impartially. It was found by interviewing workers in the "Hawthorne Studies"⁷ that a very high percentage of complaints was not due to the policies of the company or working conditions, but to some fancied or real unfairness imposed upon the worker which upset his social equilibrium. The assignment of a desk or placement at the work bench frequently made the worker feel an injustice had been done him with the resultant loss of security. Every effort should be made to make men feel they are being treated justly and fairly.

Future security. - A man might feel perfectly secure in the present but so seriously disturbed by the uncertainties the future offers that he does not do his work well. This point is well illustrated by the "short timers" attitude in the Navy.

⁷Ibid., p. 365.

When a man's enlistment is about to expire, or if he knows that he will be transferred shortly, the uncertainty of the future disturbs him to such an extent that his work suffers.

Uncertainty is the father of rumor, and rumor probably disturbs men more than any other item. It is well to remember that uncertainty is almost always worse than certainty, however serious the certainty may be. Many commanders recognized this problem during the war and had scheduled broadcasts over the loudspeaker system informing the crew what had been accomplished during the day and what was expected in the future. As a rule the crew did not desire confidential information of future operational plans, but did want to know where they were headed and why. It is hoped the Navy will recognize the importance of these broadcasts and continue during peacetime to keep the men informed of what is going on as a technique of motivation.

Confidence of the men in an officer's ability is essential to establish security among the crew. This can be well illustrated by the crew of a patrol bomber. Until the crew have had an opportunity to pass judgment upon the ability of the pilot, they will remain insecure, but after several experiences in which the pilot shows good judgment and ability, their fears of his getting them into trouble dissipate. This same attitude of the crew exists, to a lesser extent, in large ships or other naval organizations.

Reactions to Frustration

This broad concept of frustration is mentioned in order

to point out its results and to try to dispel the idea that "gripping" is always a healthy sign of morale among the crew.

One source describes frustration as follows:

A man is frustrated when he has a strong need that cannot be satisfied. There are various ways in which the satisfaction of a need may be thwarted.

There may be an external obstacle. His commander refuses him a leave . . .

Or the obstacle may be internal. It may be another conflicting need. You cannot always have both honor and safety together, though you may need them both.

Sometimes the obstacle is not clear or specific. Nevertheless a man may feel frustrated and do his best to find some person or thing to blame, to serve as a scapegoat . . .⁸

All men suffer frustration to a greater or lesser degree. Some men have the ability to adjust themselves to the external or internal obstacles and are said to have a high degree of frustration tolerance; while other men are unable to adjust themselves to these obstacles are said to have a low degree of frustration tolerance. It is unnecessary to point out that seafaring is an unnatural way for men to live, nor is it necessary to call attention to the fact that some men are better adapted to the sea than others; but it is essential all officers know that acute frustration will make motivation of men extremely difficult if not impossible.

When a man becomes frustrated by meeting some external or internal obstacle which he cannot overcome, one of two things may happen: He may become angry and aggressive, usually

⁸E. G. Boring (ed.), Psychology for the Armed Services, (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945), p. 319.

evidenced in the Navy by "gripping;" or, he may become depressed and fearful, developing the defeatist attitude commonly identified with the "sad sack" personality. The man is more likely to become aggressive and angry if he can possibly find a reason to place the blame for his frustration upon some individual or external object such as the food served aboard ship.

If, however, a man is placed in a situation which makes him feel inferior, or given a job assignment that he is either physically or mentally unqualified to handle, he is liable to place the blame upon his own lack of ability. This individual is likely to become depressed or fearful, and in extreme cases such depression may lead to suicide.

Of the two reactions to frustration, anger or aggressiveness is far more desirable than depression or fear. Anger and aggressiveness have possibilities of being utilized as a means of motivation if directed properly. Anger against the enemy, against shirkers, or against other undesirable objects, can be directed as a stimulus to get action of one kind or another from frustrated men. On the other hand, reaction to frustration by depression is far more serious, for then the men become apathetic, worried, tired, and ineffectual. Depressed men have given up the struggle, assumed a defeatist attitude, and submissively resigned themselves to their fate. In such individuals or groups of individuals there is little "gripping" or aggressiveness, but as naval units they have little value.

The chances are heavily loaded against any naval unit

having a group of men that are not frustrated in one way or another. Yet there appear to be in the Navy some squadrons and ships that escape the overt reactions to frustration. It is the writer's opinion that one reaction to frustration in the Navy has been the development of an exaggerated sense of humor among men performing extended and arduous tasks of work. Many observers have noted that men provisioning ships, taking on ammunition, or engaged in other all hands jobs, compete with one another in making "wise cracks." Some of this humor is dull, some of it is objectionable, but occasionally a remark is made that gives the group a laugh. This usually breaks the group tension and gives the men something humorous to think about. The seaman whose Chief Petty Officer informed him positively, colorfully, and in great detail that his request for special liberty had been refused, blithely informed the bystanders: "I'm the executive type; all I wanted to know was 'yes' or 'no'." This anecdote is one of the legion of examples of Navy humor.

This intriguing psychological phenomenon of exaggerated humor in the Navy warrants serious study by the students of human behavior. Not only does this sense of humor serve as an escape from frustration, but it is considered a major contributing factor in the development of what is called "The Navy Spirit." This cherished possession of Navy Spirit must be protected and improved, if possible, as a powerful means of motivation.

Recognition of Individual Differences

The men of the Navy differ from one another in hundreds

of ways, with no two of them being alike in all respects. They differ in height, weight, color of skin, size of feet, shape of head, reaction time, manual dexterity, intelligence, reasoning ability, education, emotional patterns, personality, interests, opinions, attitudes, and in many other ways. Individuals deviate from the norm to such a varying extent in physical, mental, and emotional characteristics that it is not possible to use a "go-no-go" gauge with any possibility of success in the assignment of men to jobs. The fact that Navy men are given the same basic training and placed in similar "bell-bottomed" trousers, certainly does not eliminate their individual differences.

Naval organization is, of necessity, based upon men fitting the jobs, and not the jobs fitting men. However, in the assignment of men to jobs, it is a requisite for motivation that officers recognize individual differences. Men like to perform tasks in which they excel. On the other hand, they soon lose interest, and in some cases become maladjusted, in assignments that are beyond their physical, mental or emotional capacity. Recognition of men's physical, mental, and emotional differences is considered so important for good motivation that each will be listed and followed by a brief discussion.

Physical Differences

The obviously physically unfit men are eliminated in recruiting. Even so, we have men varying in height from 5' 6" to 6' 6"; weighing from approximately 120 pounds to 250 pounds; and varying to the extremes in strength. The matter

of physical strength a man possesses is not nearly so important in the Navy now as it was a hundred years ago. Nevertheless, stamina and motor skills are important and usually go with sound physical development.

Historically, physical development has played an important role. At least half of the curriculum of Ancient Greek civilization was physical training. Physical fitness has been prized in most countries either as a requisite for military service or as a prerequisite for life adjustment. It has been determined that physical activity and training foster growth in motor skill ability.

Some men are capable of being trained to accomplish highly complicated and precision feats that require muscular coordination to a high degree, while other men of approximately the same physical characteristics can only perform physical feats requiring simple and uncoordinated muscular development. There are also men who can perform complex tasks which require a high degree of mental concentration under distracting conditions, while other men are unable to perform simple tasks under pressure.

The important point for officers and candidate officers to remember is that if a man is placed in a job requiring muscular coordination which he is unable to perform, frustration of the individual is almost certain to occur. Fortunately, there is ample opportunity in the Navy to observe men at work and at play to determine those who have the ability to be trained to perform highly complicated tasks, and those who have only

the ability to perform simple jobs. For example, observation of a man's form, coordination, and stamina while playing basketball will give the observer an excellent opportunity to estimate his potentialities for later skill development. An awkward guard is not likely to make a good "gun captain" while an agile, well-coordinated forward is most likely to be able to perform tasks requiring complex skills.

Difference in Intelligence

Intelligence is only one phase of an individual's personality, but a very important one. Although it has been known that individuals differ in intelligence for many centuries, only in recent years have psychologists been able to measure variations in mental abilities with any degree of validity. One authority defines intelligence as follows:

Intelligence, general: Defined as the ability of a man to make use of his experience in adapting to new situations. As frequently considered, it is composed of two abilities: (1) General or verbal ability to deal with ideas, words, and concepts. This is general intelligence; (2) Special or mechanical ability to deal with objects, tools, things. This is called special intelligence.⁹

Many different forms of intelligence tests have been developed and used extensively, particularly in the field of education. The Navy's basic battery of the General Classification Test is considered one of the best groups of tests for determining both general and special intelligence. These tests are gaining much attention and favor among psychologists and

⁹L. A. Pennington, Lt. Col. R. B. Bough, H. W. Chase, The Psychology of Military Leadership, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943), p. 269.

educators. This battery of tests, given to all enlisted men with results recorded on pages 4A and 4B of their service record, is not infallible in determining a man's intelligence. Nevertheless, these tests do have high correlation in both validity and reliability, and certainly are superior to general estimates or guesses of a man's intelligence.

Much valid information concerning a man's mental abilities can be obtained from pages 4A and 4B of his service record. Officers should become thoroughly familiar with the meaning of the marks in this record and utilize the information as a guide in making assignments to schools or other tasks requiring mental ability. It is nothing short of criminal to assign a man a job which he is mentally incapable of performing. Such an assignment will invariably lead to dissatisfaction in the man and possibly to maladjustment. Officers should realize the damage done to a man's self-respect and self-confidence when he is given a mental task which he is unable to perform.

There are also men who have such high intelligence quotients that care should be exercised in the assignment of their duties. If such men are given simple jobs not commensurate with their mental abilities, there remains the possibility of maladjustment. Disciplinary problems often develop due to the assignment of simple tasks which do not keep the intelligent man sufficiently interested in his work.

Differences in Personality Patterns

Just as there are differences in physical and mental abilities of men, there is also a wide range of differences in their personality patterns. Not only do physical and mental characteristics go to make up an individual's personality, but also the degree and intensity of his emotions, such as love, hate, fear, anger, ambitions, and jealousy.

Few terms are used more and less understood than that of "personality." There are so many unmeasurable factors making up a man's personality that the word defies a satisfactory definition. One author lists over fifty definitions for the word. Among the definitions considered of a more adequate type is the one given by Dashiell:

An individual's personality is defined as his system of reactions and reaction-possibilities in toto as viewed by fellow-members of society. It is the sum total of behavior trends manifested in his social adjustments.¹⁰

When one is said to possess a "strong personality", a "weak personality", or a "pleasing personality", it is an expression of how that individual's behavior pattern affects the speaker and may be not only misleading but also without basis in fact. The point made here is that an individual may evidence several different personalities when judged by the reactions which he produces on different individuals.

Our consideration of this difficult and complex problem of personality patterns will be concerned with the factors

¹⁰J. F. Dashiell, Fundamentals of Objective Psychology, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), p. 551.

or influences which bear a direct relationship to the techniques of motivation. Whatever may be the cause of these variations in personality patterns does not concern the Navy more than indirectly. It is in recognizing their existence and utilizing personnel to the fullest capacity that we can gain the greatest benefit.

Close observation of personality patterns by competent officers is necessary for type casting or "personality stereotyping" to be useful in predicting what a person will do under various conditions. One author on the subject of personality stereotyping states:

The fact remains, however, that, in forming our behavior, we must try to predict what its effect will be upon those to whom we adjust. The gap between our ability to predict and the necessity for trying to predict has been abridged to a degree by resort to "personality stereotyping."⁶ This is the trick of predicting what a person will do in accordance with a type classification rather than in accordance with actual knowledge of his personality. The primitive war leader, the sage elder of the tribe, or the crafty magic man can know what to do even in times of crises, because each knows the personality of the men and women in the group which he must lead. Of course there are variables to grapple with, for each member has some individual traits. Long acquaintance with each personality, however, makes behavior fairly predictable. Thus the war leader assigns his men to their separate tasks in terms of their total personalities; in turn each member of the war party can reasonably depend upon those with whom he must work and upon whom his personal safety may be dependent. By his intimate acquaintance with them he will be enabled to adjust himself accordingly.¹¹

Native ability and experience, rather than training, appears to be the most successful means for development of the art of personality stereotyping. This technique should be used

¹¹Richard T. LaPiere and Paul R. Farnsworth, Social Psychology, (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1936), p. 203.

only in making initial assignment of tasks in an emergency, then checked by observations whenever practicable. The officer who thinks he can predict a man's ability in a given job by his eyes, his hair, the shape of his chin, or other anatomical characteristics, has little factual data to support his contentions. Nevertheless, decisions do have to be made in the assignment of tasks, and officers should make a sincere effort to estimate a man's total personality in the assignment and then carefully check the results by close observation of the individual's personality in terms of work performance. Certainly an intelligent, nervous, high-strung man should not be assigned a simple repetitious task if a dull, phlegmatic man is available. A careful and continuous study should be made of men's personality patterns with the purpose of assigning personnel to jobs which will serve the best interests of the individual and the Navy.

Conclusions

In summarizing this discussion of basic psychological requirements for motivation, the following conclusions are considered to be important:

1. Every officer should act in such a way that each contact with an enlisted man makes that man feel important and that what he is doing is important.
2. Praise should be used to the maximum extent possible without losing its power as a stimulant.
3. An individual's personal problems are important to the man and indirectly important to the Navy.

4. Men should be called by names rather than numbers. Every officer should pride himself on not only knowing each man's name, but as much other information as possible about him.

5. For an individual to feel important three factors are necessary:

- (a) He must feel important to himself,
- (b) He must feel important to his shipmates, and
- (c) He must feel important to his superiors.

6. Every billet in the Navy is important, so every man filling these billets is important.

7. Every officer should act in such a way that each contact he has with an enlisted man increases that man's sense of security.

8. Men feel insecure when first reporting aboard a ship or on a change of command due to their not knowing what is expected.

9. Uncertainty is the father of rumors, and rumors disturb men's security.

10. Informing men by daily broadcast over the loud-speaking system does much to decrease insecurity.

11. All men are subject to frustration in the Navy. The most desirable reaction to frustration is a sense of humor even though it may be exaggerated. Our priceless heritage is the "Navy Spirit" which is partially based upon this sense of humor.

12. Officers should use every opportunity to observe

men at work or play for motor skill development, and assign men to manual tasks accordingly.

13. Intelligence is only one phase of an individual's personality but an important one.

14. Officers should become thoroughly familiar with pages 4A and 4B of every man's service record and utilize this information as a guide in making assignments.

15. No man should be assigned a mental task beyond his capacity.

16. In making assignments careful consideration should be given to the man's personality pattern.

17. Type casting should be used only in an emergency, and then carefully checked by close observation of the individual's job performance.

CHAPTER II

DISCIPLINE AS A MOTIVATING FACTOR

Introduction

In Chapter I the psychological requirements of "sense of security", "sense of achievement", "frustration", and "recognition of individual differences" were discussed in order that the reader might appreciate the significance of these psychological factors in the motivation of men. In this chapter the history, theory, and effects of discipline will be developed, and in addition, certain aspects of formal and informal organizations will be examined to show the relationship among organization, discipline and motivation.

To some people the word discipline carries with it connotations of severity, unreasonable curtailment of freedom, restrictions, and adherence to arbitrary and unreasonable demands of authority; while to others the word characterizes so many aspects of military virtues that it loses much of its meaning. Actually discipline is not synonymous with punishment. According to the New International Dictionary of the English Language, the original meaning of discipline was as follows:

1. The treatment suited to a disciple or learner: education: development of the faculties by instructions and exercises; training whether physical, mental, or moral.

It later came to mean:

2. Training to act in accordance with established rules; accustoming to systematic and regular action; drill.

Later meanings that are generally accepted today and still in use include:

3. Subjection to rule; submissiveness to order and control; habit of obedience.

4. Subjection to rule; chastisement inflicted by way of correction and training; hence training through suffering.¹

A broader and more functional approach to the subject of discipline will be taken in this chapter where discipline implies subjection to a control exerted for the best interests of the group.

History of Naval Discipline

Historically, many of our Articles for the Government of the Navy existed before the adoption of the Constitution or the formation of the United States. One of the first, if not the first, codes of maritime regulations applying specifically to discipline on naval ships was made in the twelfth century by Richard, Coeur de Lion. These laws were based upon sea laws derived from the Romans' laws of centuries before. The Romans in turn had obtained them from Mediterranean cities and states. The first American articles were adopted by the Continental Congress in 1775, seven months before the Declaration of Independence. These articles were taken from The King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions and modified

¹New International Dictionary of the English Language, (Springfield: G. and C. Merriman Co., 1924), p. 634.

where necessary to meet American ideals. The present articles, with numerous modifications, additions, and amendments, basically are much the same as those first used in the American Navy.

In early days very severe punishments for violations of regulations were customary. The barbarity of penalties inflicted was in keeping with the vindictive theory of discipline. The severity of punishment was the deterrent factor for maintaining group control. An early instance was the penalty for a man found guilty of sleeping on watch for the fourth time: he was to be tied to the bowsprit, furnished with a biscuit, a can of beer and a knife. There he had a choice of cutting himself loose and drowning or starving to death.

It wasn't until the time of our Civil War that the use of severe type of punishment as a means of motivation was discontinued. With the development of modern weapons and the steam ship, it was found necessary to give officers and men more initiative and freedom for independent action. Fear of severe punishments being inflicted could no longer be used as a means of disciplining men performing highly complex tasks requiring judgment as well as physical coordination. Experimental studies have proven conclusively that severe punishments as a means of motivation definitely interfere with the accomplishment of difficult and complicated tasks which require individual skill and coordination. One authority on the subject of the motivating effect of punishment says:

A considerable number of experiments bear on the motivating influence of punishment, and the general conclusion seems to be that punishment increases human efficiency in many, but not all tasks. The motivating effect of punishment seems to be a function depending upon a number of factors, such as intensity of punishment, complexity of task, stability of habits involved, degree of insight, and individual differences in the sensitivity of receptors.²

It should be obvious that the Navy could never maintain effective control of personnel working in radio and radar or operating other highly complex equipment if such discipline were maintained by fear of severe punishment. It is essential that men have a certain amount of leeway of action in order to insure freedom of judgment in action.

Theory of Discipline

Throughout recorded history, human behavior has been strongly influenced by religious beliefs. Horrible punishments were inflicted upon individuals violating the dignity of some ancient deity, while even today some men preach of hell-fires and brimstone for those who fail to accept certain theological doctrines. It is but natural, therefore, to expect the evolution of discipline to parallel closely that of religious doctrines and beliefs.

One authority lists five theories of discipline that can be traced through history.³ These theories will be discussed because all of them apply to the Navy, and it is

²C. M. Diserens and James Vaughn, "The Experimental Psychology of Motivation," Psychological Bulletin, XXVIII (1931), p. 40.

³Nelson Bossing, Progressive Methods of Teaching in Secondary Schools, (Cambridge: Houghton Miffland Co., 1935.)

desirable that personnel should understand and appreciate the development and implications of each.

1. The Vindictive Theory of Discipline.

The vindictive theory is an ancient conception of discipline, and it is in harmony with the religions of primitive peoples. Their gods were thought of as tyrants who wreaked vengeance upon any violators of the gods' honor or dignity. The people did not hold these deities responsible to any code of ethics but felt that the gods' demands for personal satisfaction must be met or terrible punishment would result. Typical of this viewpoint is the ancient theory, "The king can do no wrong," which prevailed until comparatively recent times.

The modern conception of this theory of discipline is "do as I say and not as I do." Much criticism levelled at military discipline after the last war was based upon the alleged double standards of discipline in effect; one for the officers, and one for the enlisted men. As a matter of fact, the officer who raids a crap game in the crews' forward living spaces and places the violators on report, then proceeds to the ward room and engages in a game of bridge for a wager of one-tenth of a cent a point, is guilty of practicing the principles of the vindictive theory of discipline. There is nothing contained in the Articles for the Government of the Navy, Navy Regulations, or General Orders and Instructions, in-

cluding Naval Courts and Boards, that permits punishment of enlisted men for an offense that does not apply to officers.

2. The Retributive Theory of Discipline.

This theory is an improvement upon the vindictive theory in that irresponsibility of inflicting punishment was no longer condoned by the people. "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," illustrates the Biblical conception of this theory. Even today some states have fixed penalties for violations of given crimes, such as the death penalty for murder in the first degree.

This theory of discipline does have some values that should not be ignored. It was used during the last war by the Navy Department's policy assigning fixed punishments for given "Absent Over Leave" and "Absent Without Leave" offenses, which will be covered in detail in a later part of this chapter. Known punishments for designated offenses would do much to prevent a few adventurous spirits from gambling on the chance that they might escape with a warning or else the punishment would be so light as to warrant committing the offense. If men know that committing a certain offense will bring retribution in the form of a fixed penalty, they face the problem of deciding whether or not committing the offense is worth the risk of the penalty. At any rate, theoretically the men have no reason to feel that naval justice is

unfair or discriminatory.

It is doubtful that the principles of the retributive theory of discipline can or should be entirely eliminated in the Navy. Rewards, usually in the form of promotions, are partially based upon a man's good conduct record, and certainly advancements in rating are withheld unless the man has a conduct mark above the required minimum. This is the negative aspect of the theory of retribution.

5. The Deterrent Theory of Discipline.

The deterrent theory is a comparatively recent development of discipline and has some of the elements of the doctrine of retribution. As far as practicable, punishment is administered in public. This serves two purposes: it tends to prevent the individual from repeating the violation, and at the same time it always serves as an example to other members of the group to remind them of the consequences for failure to comply with the laws. Public hangings, public whipping posts, and the stocks in the public square are all historical examples of punishments not only administered according to the retributive doctrine for the offender, but to serve as a deterrent to future violations. In school the theory resulted in making the student stand in the corner and wear a "dunce cap", or in other forms of punishment inflicted before the rest of the class.

The deterrent theory of discipline is used to some extent in the Navy. The one gun salute and breaking the union jack at the yardarm is a device to remind the officers and men of the fleet that a General Court Martial is in session. Publishing to the crew at quarters the findings and sentences of Summary and Deck Court Martials is another means of reminding the crew that offenders have been punished for violations of the regulations.

Article 74 (3) (d) U. S. Navy Regulations states:

Court-martial orders: These shall publish to the service such extracts from the records of proceedings of courts martial and from the action of the department thereon as may be deemed desirable. They shall be signed by the Secretary of the Navy.⁴

The deterrent theory is used extensively in maintaining the negative type of discipline. It is based upon fear of physical pain and loss of status for the individual, and is also used as an example of what will happen to others unless their conduct is satisfactory. This subject will be discussed more completely in another section of this chapter.

4. The Remedial Theory of Discipline.

The church and society became dissatisfied with the negative approach to discipline as used in our penal institutions. Fear as a restraining influence upon men was not entirely satisfactory since would-be violators were deterred only while they feared the

⁴U. S. Navy Regulations, 1920. Reprinted 1932, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), p. 22.

consequences. A more desirable approach is to place the emphasis upon building institutions not as punishment centers, but as reform agencies to be used as a means of rehabilitating the individual. Reform schools, prison farms, prisoner industries, prison schools, etc., are all examples of this project for human reclamation. The State of California has been one of the leaders in the development of the remedial theory of discipline. Warden Duffy has made San Quentin Prison an outstanding example of what can be done in the rehabilitation of prisoners.

The Navy has not lagged in the use of this theory. Special boards of review, under the Secretary of the Navy, carefully consider each court martial case before sentences are approved. Men with good prison records are sent back to the service or discharged after completing a part of their sentences. In the past few years there has been a marked change in the methods by which our prisoners are managed, with trained penologists in charge of naval prisons. Determined efforts are being made to rehabilitate and return to the service men who are sent to naval prisons. The Navy thinks of this theory of discipline as a means of changing the attitude and conduct of the prisoners in order that they will desire to conform with the standards of conduct required by the service.

5. The Prophylaxis Theory of Discipline.

The prophylaxis theory goes one step beyond the remedial theory in that it is advocated as a preventive method instead of a cure. It has been estimated that over two billion dollars is spent every year in America to cover the cost to society of crime. The new point of view is that if more money were spent to prevent maladjustments, there would be less crime and therefore less need for money to correct the bad crime situation that has been allowed to develop. As a result, billions of dollars have been expended to build public parks, playgrounds, amusement centers and golf links for the benefit of the public and indirectly for the prevention of crime.

The Navy has carried on extensive work in the development of the prophylaxis theory of discipline. Athletic teams, movies, libraries, schools, recreation centers, reading rooms, and chapels are only a few of the many devices utilized as a means of developing the right patterns of thought and the right habits of conduct among the men. The importance of using preventive techniques in maintaining discipline cannot be overstressed as a means of motivating the men of the Navy.

Positive and Negative Discipline

In military circles discipline is too often thought of in the negative sense, while actually positive discipline is much more effective and plays the more important part in any

organization. However, it should be recognized that both positive and negative discipline exist, not only in military establishments but in business, schools, homes, clubs, and any other organization where it is necessary to facilitate group control.

The motivating effect of discipline cannot be determined by a scientific measuring scale. One of the factors making psychological studies of human behavior so inconclusive is the lack of a scientific measuring scale for behavior. Such a scale cannot be devised for a mechanism as complex, inconsistent, and variable as the human being.

However, the effects of discipline as a motivating factor can be rated roughly by means of an intensity scale. We let one end of the scale represent positive discipline; the other, negative discipline. The former represents intrinsic interest; the latter, fear. A large measure between these two extremes will be a "neutral" zone which will represent a combination in intensity of both positive and negative discipline.

A seaman is ordered to paint the motor whale-boat and does it in a seaman-like manner. Was the excellence of his work due to positive or negative discipline? Most likely it was within the "neutral" zone where he received a sense of satisfaction from a job well done, but he also felt a subconscious fear of censure or punishment if he failed to do an acceptable job. This same intensity of discipline exists in schools where the students are concerned about their marks,

in business where the worker is concerned about his job, and in other organizations where discipline exists. Some organizations are controlled by positive discipline and some by negative discipline, but most operate under a combination of the two.

Effects of Positive Discipline on Motivation

Positive discipline may be defined as the development of that state of mind in which individuals or groups of individuals will do the proper thing with or without specific instruction. It might be stated that positive discipline is the preventive while negative discipline is the cure.

No set of "golden rules" could be formulated that would develop positive discipline in a naval organization. Rather, certain attitudes should be analyzed and a scientific approach made to the solution of the problem. Factors that would be effective in one situation might be ineffective in others, and techniques utilized by one officer might be totally unsuitable for another.

A limited number of these factors which are considered most significant will be listed. These will be followed by such discussion as is deemed desirable for the assistance of officers and candidate officers in making a critical and analytical approach to gaining and maintaining positive discipline within their organizations.

1. Create a general atmosphere of approval in the organization.

This point goes back to the "sense of security" discussed in the first chapter, in which it was shown that all people desire to be secure, not only in the present but in the future. This atmosphere is created by the attitude of the officers, not so much in what they do but in the way they do it. It is relatively independent of the strictness with which rules and regulations are enforced.

2. Let the men know what is expected of them.

Personnel should have the ship's orders, regulations, and other formal organization directives explained to them. They should know their duties, their places in the organization, and their responsibilities in order to prevent errors and omissions with a resulting loss of discipline.

3. Men should know for certain that their officers will support them as long as they perform their duties to the best of their abilities.

This point is particularly important for those men assigned tasks requiring the exercise of judgment, and where failure to use good judgment might reflect discredit not only upon the man but upon his officer. "Buck passing" at the expense of the men is fatal to discipline. Responsibility for any Navy unit's performance of duty is rightfully fixed upon the officers and cannot be shifted. This makes it essential for officers to support the men in the accomplishment of any difficult assignment.

4. The men should be kept informed of the progress they are making.

Men who are doing superior work should know it, and those doing inferior work should be told in order that they may improve their performance. Knowledge of one's progress is one of the greatest motivating forces that can be used. The individual who works hard and gets no apparent credit for his work is very likely to give up. On the other hand, a man doing inferior work may think he is getting away with something and then be sincerely disappointed when he is not selected for advancement in rating.

5. The men should be informed, within security restrictions, of any changes that will affect their present or future sense of security.

"Scuttlebutt" dope is prevalent on all ships and has a tendency to spread half-truths or rumors. Official information should be given to the men when practical before the rumors or "leaks" have an opportunity to spread. If men know that they will always be given adequate warning of changes, they will not fear them nearly so much.

6. The men must know that they will receive impartial treatment with no favoritism shown to any individual or group of individuals.

This statement may appear so obvious that it need not be made, yet it is one of the most serious problems in the maintenance of discipline that confronts

officers. There are many men who sincerely believe their failure in the Navy is based solely upon their officers disliking them. Then, there is the possibility that officers may find certain individuals upon whom they can rely and may fail to give the other members of the group opportunities to prove themselves. It is admittedly difficult to be fair and impartial in dealing with a large group of men. Nevertheless impartial treatment is essential in order to maintain positive discipline in the organization.

7. The men must have confidence in and respect for their officers' professional ability.

This point is well illustrated by Army polls used during the last war to find out what the American soldier thinks about the problems of Army life.

. . . Soldiers have been asked what they think makes a good leader. . . they say they like and respect competence in a leader more than any other single attribute.⁵

It is possible for an officer to be popular without being respected, but such a phenomenon occurs so infrequently in the Navy as to be neglected. Practically everyone desires to be popular, which comes back to one of the psychological factors stated in the first chapter, the desire for recognition. However, for men to have a sense of security, both present and future, they must have confidence in their officers' professional ability. It should not be overlooked that

⁵E. G. Boring (ed.), Psychology for the Armed Services, (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945), p. 468.

while officers are sizing up men for job assignments, the men are also forming opinions of the officers' abilities. The men have an advantage in numbers and ability to compare notes. There are many officers in the Navy who are respected and popular, some who are respected and unpopular, but few indeed who are not respected but popular.

8. The men should be kept informed of their mission in the sense that they are headed toward a definite objective.

It follows that the more clearly men see the goal or objective, the more they will be motivated. If planes are being prepared for long over-water flight; the ship is being prepared for the annual Military Inspection; the engineering plant checked before a full power run; or the ship is being prepared for Day Battle Practice, the men should know it. The writer does not advocate explaining to enlisted men the reasons they should obey orders, but rather keeping them informed of major missions and giving them the sense of "belonging" and "importance" to the Navy.

9. There should be delegation of authority with corresponding responsibility as far down in the organization as competence exists.

Most men desire to accept responsibility if they feel capable of doing the job. It makes them feel they are important and are doing something worthwhile. There are many routine jobs in every unit that can be

assigned to an individual as a sole responsibility, thereby insuring that the job will be done well with a minimum of supervision.

Effects of Negative Discipline on Motivation

In an ideal situation the necessity for negative discipline would not exist. However, there are occasions when every officer must fall back on negative discipline as a last resort. On the other hand, there are a few officers who feel that the best way to get positive action by men is to be severe with them, to keep them in constant fear of being punished or losing status. This doubtful gain in efficiency is more than outweighed by destroying initiative with the resulting desire of the men to escape, or to do only the amount of work which will get them by without punishment.

Negative discipline is primarily based upon fear - - the fear of physical pain, embarrassment or the threatened loss of status. The greatest of these fears is threatened loss of status. Fear is one of the strongest of human emotions, and if intense it will cause fatigue, anxiety, depression, worry, and a desire to escape. Needless to say, fear or negative discipline should be used only in those cases where all other methods of positive discipline have failed. Punishment is a powerful weapon for motivation. It should be used only when consideration has been given to its possible consequences.

In the following pages, a few of the more significant items pertaining to the correct administration of negative discipline will be listed and discussed briefly.

1. It is the certainty of punishment and not the severity that makes it an important factor in maintaining discipline.

History of many centuries shows that severity of punishment alone has never provided an answer to disciplinary problems. If fear of punishment is to act as a deterrent, it must be certain. To overlook punishment is to reduce its corrective value and also to risk its omission. If punishment is uncertain there will be a few adventurous souls who will be willing to take a chance, with the result that more and more violations of the regulations will occur.

A study of the Articles for the Government of the Navy reveals the so-called "punitive" articles serve not only as a naval penal code with emphasis on certainty of punishment, but as a schedule of limitations of punishments which may be adjudged by various officers charged with the administration of justice. The first of these seventy articles defines the doctrine of naval discipline and should be read carefully and understood by all officers. This article will be quoted for purposes of refreshing officers of its contents and making candidate officers aware of its implications in administering negative discipline.

Article 1. Commanders' duties of example and correction. The commanders of all fleets, squadrons, naval stations and vessels belonging to the Navy, are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their

command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and any such commander who offends against this article shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.⁶

2. In the administration of negative discipline, punishment must be impartial to all individuals and all groups.

The individual who receives a Summary Court Martial for committing an offense, while another guilty of the same offense escapes with a warning, has a right to feel that the sense of justice has been violated. If punishment is to serve as a deterrent by providing an object lesson to the wrong-doer and a forcible example to others that the offense must not be repeated, then punishment should not only be certain but impartial. Equal justice under the law has a deep meaning to all Americans. It is not sufficient that naval court-martial affords more protection and more reviews for the individual than ever accorded a defendant under civil law; it must be true also that all individuals committing the same offense shall receive the same type of punishment.

During the past war when relatively inexperienced officers were administering discipline, it was found that a wide variation of punishments were being given for identical offenses. This was particularly noticeable from the offenses "absent over leave" and "absent

⁶Naval Justice (restricted), (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 510.

without leave," which comprised about seventy-five percent of all offenses committed. Obviously, variation in punishment for the same offense is not conducive to good discipline.

In order to counteract this wide divergence in assignment of punishment for absence offenses, the Secretary of the Navy issued a policy letter to promote uniformity in the assignment of punishment.⁷ Exceptions to this policy could be made where investigation or evidence indicated the ends of justice would be better served by a lesser or greater punishment than prescribed. However, a separate letter explaining the reasons for deviation from this policy must be attached to the record of the court-martial.

From studies made in industry and in school systems, it appears that this policy of setting fixed penalties for given offenses merits serious consideration as a permanent policy for administering equal punishments for all standard offenses throughout Navy establishments.

3. Punishment should be administered as soon after the offense is committed as practicable.

Not only should punishment be impartial and certain, but it should be administered as soon after the offense as practical in order to obtain maximum effectiveness. Delay is detrimental to morale since

⁷Secretary of the Navy, SecNav Circular Letter 45-529 dated May 1945, (Washington: Navy Department, 1945), p. 1 - 4.

it causes worry and uncertainty in the offender. In addition, the loss of man days has an adverse effect upon the efficiency of the Navy.

4. In the administration of negative discipline it should be emphasized that it is the "system" and not an individual punishing the offender.

Men should be instructed to accept the fact that they are playing under certain rules of the game, and if they violate any of these rules, they are penalized accordingly. Never should they have reason to feel there is discrimination against them nor that the punishment is personalized. Under the Navy's concept of discipline, punishment is not personal; it is not vindictive; nor is it inflicted as revenge for misconduct. Certainly anger should never be allowed to enter into the administration of discipline.

5. Punishment once administered should be forgotten.

Men should be made to feel, after they have paid the penalty for violation of the regulations, that it will not be held against them. Although records of offenses are required in order to determine chronic offenders, a man should not be made to feel that he is an outcast due to one offense. The value of punishment lies in the fact that the offense must not be repeated, not in the branding of an individual as a dangerous character. The penalty should not take away the inclination to remedy the error, but rather encourage the individual to mend his ways.

6. The loss of individual status is the most severe punishment that can be inflicted.

This point is emphasized by the announced policy of the Navy Department which disapproves the imposition of solitary confinement upon petty officers because it has a degrading effect upon the man. Great care should be used when administering discipline which has the tendency to destroy an individual's status with his shipmates. Frequently this type of punishment does more harm than good, as it leaves the man with no other alternative than to be a disciplinary problem in order to gain recognition.

Discipline Derived from Formal Organization

Formal organization may be defined as the structural relationship set up to obtain coordination and cooperation of a group to carry out a mission. Too often the value of good formal organization is not appreciated as a means of gaining and maintaining positive discipline. The necessity for maintaining a structure whereby authority and responsibility are clearly defined for each individual in the group should be apparent to all naval officers.

Much criticism and ridicule of military organizations has been made during the past few years. No doubt some of the criticism has been justified; however, it has been found that when writers or lecturers wish to emphasize a strong point in organization, they frequently use the military line and staff organization as a good example. Actually, the major difference between large industrial and military organizations is that

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the former are more frequently based upon the individual's abilities while the military organization is, by necessity, based upon the job.

As a rule, naval organizations are dynamic and subject to constant and sometimes imperceptible changes. New equipment, new methods, new objectives, or new personnel complements necessitate changes in the organization. When such changes are effected, great care should be exercised in making the corresponding changes in the Ship's Organization Book, Watch-Quarter-Station Bills, Ship's Orders, and other related organizational implements.

One authority on the subject of business organization states:

The mere desire to work harmoniously and effectively together is not enough. The organization structure must be properly adapted to a given situation to make it effective. In the absence of a clearly defined authority and fixed responsibility there will be much hesitancy and wasted effort.⁸

The extent to which negative discipline must be used is largely an index of management's efficiency in developing positive discipline A group of supervisors or men cooperate readily when they have been conditioned as a result of positive discipline to the point of thoroughly understanding (1) the principles underlying the organization of which they are a part, (2) the aims of the enterprise, and (3) the policies which guide their work. Persons equipped with this knowledge and understanding handle their responsibilities with ease; they do not need elaborate written procedures or detailed instructions from their superiors. Their decisions are generally sound because they are based on a broad background of principles and policies.⁹

⁸W. R. Spriegel, Principles of Business Organization, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946), p. 495.

⁹Ibid., p. 465.

Some of the Navy's ablest officers direct their abilities to developing and maintaining a practical and efficient organization. This problem is under constant study and changes are based upon many variable conditions. When failures in organization do occur, they are most often due to lack of understanding and appreciation on the part of officers in the lower echelons.

One fact is certain; positive discipline cannot exist in an organization in which the men do not know what they are to do, when they are to do it, or why they are to do it. All officers would do well to study their organization charts, books, and bills in order to keep these instructions up-to-date. In this manner, officers and men of the command are able to know what is expected of them.

Effects of Informal Organization on Discipline

An authority on business organization has said one of the reasons that new wartime industries had difficulty in getting production started was a lack of informal organization. This statement will be readily accepted by any officer who has passed through the ordeal of commissioning and shaking down a new ship. It takes time for cliques to form and for individuals to find out who's who and what's what. Bernard in Functions of the Executive says:

. . . that formal organizations, once established in their turn also create informal organizations; and . . . that informal organizations are necessary to the operation of formal organizations as a means of communication, of cohesion, and of protecting the integrity of the individual.¹⁰

¹⁰Chester T. Bernard, The Functions of the Executive, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 123.

When "Ski" invites "Mac" to the signal bridge, or the First Lieutenant suggests that he and the Gunnery Officer step into the wardroom for a cup of coffee, it does not necessarily mean they are loafing, but rather that the ship's informal organization is functioning. Many decisions are made, or conflicts settled over a cup of coffee, that otherwise would have to be dealt with through official channels. No set of official channels can be built deep enough and wide enough to carry all the traffic that is handled through informal organizations.

The formation of cliques or social groups is a natural growth in any organization. They exist not only among the workers but also among supervisory and management personnel. These cliques form within the bounds of the formal organizational structure but never show in the organization book or chart.

In the "Hawthorne Studies," fourteen men representing three occupational groups - - wiremen, soldermen, and inspectors, working in the Bank Wiring Observation Room were observed on this subject. It was found that they formed in cliques with the following basic sentiments:

1. You should not turn out too much work. If you do, you are a "rate buster."
2. You should not turn out too little work. If you do, you are a "chiseler."
3. You should not tell a supervisor anything that will react to the detriment of an associate. If you do, you are a "squealer."
4. You should not attempt to maintain social distance or act officious. If you are an inspector, for

example, you should not act like one.¹¹

Six of the men, considered the best clique, conformed to all of the above rules, while five men formed a group considered undesirable conforming to rules one, three and four. Three of the workmen did not belong to either of the groups.

Not all cliques that form are for the best interest of the Navy. As in civilian society, certain groups form that are a menace to the people. In civil life the police frequently are able to break up such a gang by arresting one or more of the leaders. In the same manner the Navy should take steps to break up undesirable cliques. Close study of the men should be made to find out what cliques do exist by observing the groups that go ashore together, those who attend the movies together, and other such group associations. If it is found that certain members of a group become disciplinary problems, the chances are the clique is an undesirable one. Ring leaders should be transferred or other appropriate action taken to break up the group.

The important point of informal organization is that cliques do exist in the Navy at all levels. The cliques whose basic sentiments are favorable can be used to advantage for maintaining positive discipline while the undesirable cliques are a menace and should be broken up.

¹¹F. J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 22.

Effect of the Lack of Discipline

Business executives, educational leaders, and psychologists all appear to agree upon one basic cause for deterioration of discipline. This is the failure to abolish an order, a rule, a regulation, or a law that is not observed by a group for any reason whatsoever. It is not important if a man fails to salute an officer, but what is important is the man and officer have both failed to carry out a directive from duly constituted authority. This results in a marked psychological change in attitude towards all rules and regulations. The now defunct prohibition amendment is a good example of a law that could not be or was not enforced. Not only was this particular law openly and freely violated, but there was a general let-down among the people in respect for all laws.

There are many instances in history that show failure of an army or country due to lack of discipline. Brigadier General C. T. Lanham has analyzed eight famous cases of troops becoming demoralized due to lack of discipline. Three of these cases are abstracted in the paragraphs below:

First case:

Date: November 9, 1870

Place: Coulmiers, France

Panicked troops: Rayeau Cavalry Division of the French First Army.

Enemy: I Bavarian Corps of the German Army.

Predisposing situation:

Troops had been hastily organized, were poorly trained, and poorly disciplined.

They were despondent from many defeats, and impressed with the superiority of the Germans. They were ordered to turn the right flank of the Bavarians, who were about to retreat. They were told that their left flank would be covered by French irregulars. Progress was slow and difficult; the Bavarian artillery had inflicted a few casualties on the French.

Immediate stimulus:

Patrols rushed in reporting that Germans were driving in on French left flank. (There were no Germans there; the patrols mistook the French irregulars for German troops.) The report spread rapidly among the troops.

Results:

They fled to the rear until they reached their bivouac area of the morning. The Bavarian Corps, although greatly outnumbered by the French, made good its retreat.¹²

Second case:

Date: November 1, 1896

Place: Adowa, Abyssinia

Panicked Troops: Italian Army.

Enemy: About 100,000 Abyssinian spearmen.

Predisposing situation:

Bad night march through wild mountain passes. Men had straggled and at dawn they found themselves separated by deep ravines into three parts. Officers and men had never worked with each other, or the infantry with the artillery. There was a lack of trust and faith in one another. Troops had heard that the enemy tortured and mutilated their prisoners. Troops heard their commander express fear at being separated from the rest of the army.

Immediate stimulus:

Troops of the left part were suddenly confronted by milling, savage hordes. Their artillery failed to get the range and was not effective.

¹²Edwin G. Boring, (ed.), Psychology for the Armed Forces, (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945), p. 459.

Results:

Men flung away their rifles and rushed towards the center, which was then stampeded towards the right. They clubbed down officers who sought to rally them. Only 3,500 of the 15,000 men escaped.¹³

Third case:

Date: August 1, 1904

Place: Haitshong, Manchuria

Panicked troops: Russian Rifle Brigade.

Enemy: Japanese troops.

Predisposing situation:

Poor morale. Dissension and petty feuds among the troops.
Troops depressed by Japanese victories.
(Nevertheless these troops were well trained, well equipped, well fed, rested, and in secure positions in reserve behind the lines.)

Immediate stimulus:

Soldier, relieving himself in a rice field, was startled by something and set up the cry: "The Japanese are coming!"
The cry spread at once.

Results:

Men grabbed their rifles and fired in all directions. Then they fled. General Kuropatkin himself failed to quiet them.
One part of them fled to a camp of corps trains and panicked them.
This part was not rallied for several days.
The other part fled to the camp of a regiment with good morale, and was restored to order by the calm demeanor of these troops.¹⁴

Students of modern history are familiar with the handicap the Russian Army was under during the early months of World War II. Their "War Commissars" and "Regimental Commissars," acting as political representatives of the Soviet Govern-

¹³Ibid., p. 458

¹⁴Ibid., p. 458

ment, gave the army a formal organization of divided responsibility and authority which did not work in combat. It must be said to the Russians' credit that it did not take them long to correct these deficiencies after their first reverses by the German Army.

The surprising defeat of the French Army in 1940 was in great part due to the relaxation of discipline. The following quotation taken from an English Staff Officer's diary explains much:

May 22nd, 1940. Still no French counter-attack to pierce the bulge. Precious opportunities have been thrown away. General Georges was asked point-blank why the promised counter-attack had not been delivered. His liaison officer spoke for him and answered that the General could not give orders so far in advance of the inclinations of the divisions. This was an eye-opener and it is only now that it is brought home to me that the formation of soldiers' committees regularized in the French Army in 1936 by Monsieur Leon Blum's regime have so far undermined discipline. G.Q.G. is definitely handicapped by the spirit of internationalism that exists to such a great extent among the rank and file.¹⁵

Those individuals who advocate a more democratic military organization, with an attendant relaxation of discipline, would do well to study the above accounts. Division of authority and responsibility lead to indecision at crucial moments, which in many cases can be more disastrous than positive action of any sort. The relaxation of discipline can well sow a seed of doubt in the minds of military personnel as to the necessity to obey a given order. A military organization must exact from its members complete and self-sacrificing

¹⁵L. A. Pennington, R. B. Hough, Jr. and H. W. Case, The Psychology of Military Leadership (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943), p. 133.

obedience to command in order to survive. A wholehearted acceptance of this philosophy can only be gained by the technique of utilizing discipline as a means of motivation.

Conclusions

In summarizing this chapter on discipline as a means of motivation, the following points are considered most important:

1. Too often discipline is thought of in the negative sense, while as a matter of fact, positive discipline is more effective and plays a more important part in any organization than does negative discipline.
2. The motivating effect of discipline cannot be measured on a scale. Both positive and negative discipline exist to a greater or lesser extent in most organizations.
3. The important factors to be considered in gaining and maintaining positive discipline are as follows:
 - (a) Create a general atmosphere of approval.
 - (b) Let the men know what is expected of them.
 - (c) Men should know for certain that their officers will support them.
 - (d) Men should be kept informed of the progress they are making.
 - (e) Men should be kept informed of any changes that will affect their sense of security.
 - (f) Men must know that they will receive impartial treatment.
 - (g) Men must have confidence in and respect for

their officers' professional ability.

(h) Men must be kept informed of their mission.

(i) Men should be given as much responsibility and authority as they can take.

4. Important factors to be considered in administering negative discipline are the following:

(a) It is the certainty and not the severity of punishment that makes negative discipline effective as a motivating factor.

(b) Punishment must be impartial to all individuals or groups.

(c) Punishment should be administered as soon after the offense is committed as practical.

(d) Men should be made to feel that it is the "system" and not the individual administering the punishment.

(e) Punishment once administered should be forgotten except for records to determine chronic offenders.

(f) Loss of status is the most severe punishment that can be administered.

5. The benefits derived from maintaining good formal organization charts, books, and bills are not fully appreciated by all naval officers as a means of maintaining positive discipline.

6. Formation of cliques is a natural growth in any organization and is necessary in order to conduct semi-official

business. These cliques should be studied carefully by all officers as means of maintaining positive discipline. Undesirable cliques should be broken up by transfers, or other measures taken to isolate the leaders.

7. Failure to cancel orders, rules, or regulations that are not enforced for any reason whatsoever, will cause deterioration of discipline in any organization.

8. History has shown that divided command and authority will not function with the efficiency required for conducting a successful war.

CHAPTER III

COMPETITION AS A MEANS OF MOTIVATION

Introduction

The preceding two chapters have dealt with basic psychological factors and discipline as related to motivation. In this chapter the background, types, and effectiveness of competition as a means of motivating men in the Navy will be investigated. Since the specific rules and organization of Navy competition now in effect are classified information, no comment will be made on them. Rather, the general features of all types of competition will be analyzed objectively to familiarize officers and candidate officers with the problems of competition used as a means of motivation.

Competition may be defined as a desire or struggle to excel in a contest. To some people this definition connotes an honorable and praiseworthy desire for excellence in performance, while to others, it implies a vicious means of establishing personal superiority. There is sufficient literature on the subject to support either conception. Nevertheless, it is certain that if competition is to be used as a tool of motivation instead of a weapon against it, care must be exercised to use it expertly at the right time and in the right place.

Background of Competition as a Motivating Factor

The American way of life, or system of free enterprise, is based upon an equal opportunity for all people to compete for financial, social, educational, athletic, and other forms of rewards. It can be shown that throughout recorded history men have used competition as a means of motivation. The Roman "laurel" presented to the winner of a chariot race has its counterpart in the "horseshoe of roses" presented to the winner of the Kentucky Derby. The Olympic Games are an example of competitive sports which have been passed down through the centuries and revived in recent times.

The winners of the Rose Bowl Game, the National League Championship, and the World's Heavyweight Championship, are examples in sport of individuals or groups receiving prestige and rewards for superiority. War is the ultimate example of competition in its worst form; two or more countries compete for desired social and economic prizes. There always have been various types of competition among peoples, and it is highly probable that there always will be.

One of the most widely discussed subjects in the Navy is the value of competition as a means of motivating men in a training situation. There are some officers who believe competition is a noxious means of making crooks out of otherwise honest men. They feel competition and rivalry should be de-emphasized for fear it is likely to defeat the very ends for which it was invoked. Actually, these officers have much factual data to support their beliefs. Hartshorne and

May¹ in their studies of deceit among school children made the startling discovery that among a certain group which had been artificially stimulated to honesty through rewards there was actually more dishonesty than among the average. These students were so strongly motivated by the desire to win prizes that they were dishonest in order to win prizes for honesty.

As a group, psychologists and educators have a tendency to de-emphasize the value of competition. One authority says: ". . . avoid competition among members of a group if it tends to foster jealousy, conceit, and hard feelings."²

On the other hand, there are those naval officers just as sincere who believe there is no substitute for competition as a means of motivating a peace time Navy in the science of training for war. These officers point out that skill and knowledge developed through the use of "Order for Gunnery Exercises" was the major factor in making our naval gunnery, both aerial and surface, the most effective among navies during the past war.

It is believed the first instance of engineering competition in any group of ships operating under definite rules was instituted during the Great White Fleet's cruise around the world. A fleet General Order issued in January

¹Hugh Hartshorne, and Mark A. May, Studies in Deceit, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), Book One, pp. 339 - 343.

²Charles Elmer Holley, High School Teachers' Methods (Champaign: The Garrard Press, 1937), p. 45.

1908 by Rear Admiral R. D. Evans, U.S.N., established two separate group competitions, one for battleships and one for destroyers. The results of this competition in fuel economy are well illustrated by the following cablegram sent to the Navy Department by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet:

Navigation, Navy Department, Washington

For Equipment: Reduce estimates coal required Colombo from twenty-three thousand to eighteen thousand tons, Negro Bay from twenty-four to twenty-one thousand tons, revised estimates rendered necessary by decreased consumption shown since leaving San Francisco. Fleet sails eighteenth.

Sperry³

Those officers who favor competition can also point out an even more important factor than economy was gained during this engineering competition; that was engineering reliability. A second quotation from this same reference gives an excellent indication of the value of this competition for improvement in material readiness:

It is useless to speculate as to the outcome if the voyage around the world had been made without competition. It was freely predicted, before the voyage began, that a trail of broken-down battleships would mark the course from Hampton Roads to San Francisco. As the break-downs that were to afford this humiliating spectacle could have referred solely to machinery casualties, it can be inferred that the state of efficiency of the engineering branch of the Navy was under grave suspicion in central quarters. The fleet actually made three times the mileage that was involved in the cruise around South America, and adhered to a schedule of dates of departures and arrivals almost without a break.

. . . How much of the actual improvement was due

³Lt. Cmdr. E. C. Kalbfus, U. S. N., History of Engineering Competition in the Navy (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1911), p. 995.

to the voyage, and how much to the competition, can never be ascertained. But previous voyages, of considerable length had failed to produce proportionate amounts of improvement.⁴

Those officers favoring competition frequently finish their argument in support of competition by asking the pertinent question: "What substitute is there for competition to motivate a peace time Navy in training for war?"

General Types of Competition Used in the Navy

In analyzing competition as a factor of motivation, we find that the subject falls logically into three separate categories:

1. Self competition under which a man desires to improve his own performance, thereby placing himself in competition with his past efforts.
2. Individual competition under which men compete with other individuals for rewards or personal satisfaction.
3. Group competition under which a group of men competes with other groups for rewards or satisfaction.

During the pre-war years the Navy used all three types of competition extensively as a means of stimulating men in training. It is probable that the wide implications of these different competitions are neither understood nor appreciated by the younger generation of naval officers. This subject is considered so essential to effective motivation that each of the above listed categories will be discussed separately and followed by recommendations for improvement.

⁴Ibid., p. 997.

Self Type of Competition

Self competition is the most effective kind of motivation and, from a mental hygiene view-point, the most healthy. Here the individual is in competition with himself and makes an effort to beat his own best performance. The marine who is trying to qualify as expert rifleman, the pilot who is trying to qualify in carrier landings, the golfer who is trying to break one hundred, or the law student who is trying to pass the bar examinations, are all in competition with themselves.

A good illustration of this method of competition is the merit badge system used to stimulate boy scouts. A boy must qualify in certain respects and pass an examination upon the subject; he is then awarded a merit badge. Since there are well over one hundred of these merit badges to be won in such fields as hygiene, woodcraft, first aid, and athletics, few boys have an opportunity to win all the badges.

Self competition used in industry. - This type of competition is used extensively in industry where the pay of workmen is on a piece work basis. Here the worker has an opportunity to increase his minimum pay by producing more than a fixed amount. This incentive system makes it possible, in some industries, for workmen to increase their "take home" pay by as much as fifty percent when they seriously strive to do so. The rules for these competitions outlined in such as the Halsey Plan, the Rowan Premium Plan, and the Ganatt Task and Bonus System, are based upon a guaranteed minimum daily wage plus a bonus in pay for workers exceeding a set standard

of production. Management and the worker divide on a percentage basis the premiums made in excess of a fixed standard of production. One disadvantage of this system is that some formulas used for computing bonuses are rather complicated and not always understood by the individual.

Many workers object to this type of incentive system on the basis that management receives the major benefits from increased efficiency. Men often will not work at all, and will rarely work well under such competition if the rules from their point of view are unsatisfactory. Unions are generally opposed to incentive systems for workers as they believe that management uses the system as a means of "speed-up", and that after workers become proficient in their jobs and production is increased the piece rates will be reduced.

Self competition used in the Navy. - Self competition as a means of motivation has been used extensively in the Navy. Submariners, aviators, range finder operators, deep sea divers, gun pointers, expert riflemen, etc., are all required to meet certain physical, mental and emotional standards, and upon completion of the course successful candidates are given a badge of one kind or another. Since these distinctions usually are open for all men who desire to compete, and require only personal ability for achievement, they are considered an excellent means of gaining and maintaining interest of men in a given field.

Naval aviation has used this system of self competition to an excellent advantage in training. Pilots and air-

crewmembers are awarded "E"s in Individual Battle Practice for dive bombing and horizontal bombing, and proficiency in firing machine guns and torpedoes. If they fulfill given requirements and make a score above a certain standard which is considered excellent, and "E" may be painted on their plane. Pilots and aircrewmembers will spend days checking their equipment, and many hours analyzing such effects as air-speed, wind, drift, and muzzle velocity, in an effort to qualify for this coveted prize. Actually the award is nothing more than a merit badge which gives the individual a strong sense of achievement in that he personally has been able to qualify under certain set requirements and he has made an "A" in the course.

Self type of competition utilized as a means of stimulating ships or units. - A very effective means of using the self type of competition among ships or groups is to assign awards to those units making a high improvement factor over their previous competitive period performance. In this manner a ship or unit is in competition with its own performance of the previous year.

This method has been used to good advantage in certain fields of competition by assigning red "E"'s to those units which show marked improvement over their own previous performances. Since this type of competition is considered the most effective kind, the subject warrants serious study to determine whether or not the base can be broadened to provide greater incentive for naval units to improve their own best performance.

Need for increasing self competition awards in the Navy. - There is an urgent need in the Navy to broaden the base for self competitive awards, particularly in the lower ratings. A man may be an excellent seaman but may never make a satisfactory petty officer. Promotion alone is neither satisfactory nor, in many cases, desirable. What is needed is some device whereby a second cruise seaman has an opportunity to qualify for a distinction that sets him apart from the group. Serious consideration should be given to developing an award similar to the Army's "Combat Infantry Badge." Such a distinction could be given a title such as a "Seafaring Badge". Requirements for this badge should be based upon a given number of years sea service with minimum required marks in conduct and proficiency in rating. Tests, both mental and physical, should be based on performance as far as practicable. Qualification should be so rigid that the award would mean something to the winner, but at the same time it should be within the capacity of a none-too-bright seaman.

The qualifications for such a badge could be increased to include petty officers, making it far more difficult for a Chief Petty Officer to win the award than for a coxswain. There are even possibilities of including officers in these qualifications, which would serve as a stimulant for self-improvement among them. At the same time such a program would give the enlisted men an opportunity to compete with the officers for prizes.

The adoption of such an idea requiring periodic qualifications, would serve as a strong stimulus for improvement and provide an opportunity for recognition to a large group of Navy men who otherwise have little opportunity to distinguish themselves. If the idea of a "Seafaring Badge" were accepted by the men as a means of achieving an honor for which some officers or petty officers fail to qualify, it is certain that much improvement could be made in the Navy physically, mentally, and emotionally.

Individual Type of Competition

Of all the types, individual competition has the least to offer as a means of motivation in the Navy. Actually, this form will frequently do more harm than good unless carefully supervised. In individual competition among a large group of men there can be only one winner; the rest must necessarily be losers. Individuals who believe themselves incapable of winning the prize have little interest in the contest. A short, fat man is not interested in competing for the high jump, nor will a dull normal student care which person stands first in the class. For the few men that have a chance to win the prize of standing first, individual competition is a powerful stimulus, but the greater percentage of the group will show little or no interest in the contest.

The ancient Greeks recognized the limitation of individual competition where there was only one winner in a contest. Partial compensation was made by introducing the pentathlon in the Olympic Games with contestants participating

in five events. At a much later date the decathlon was also introduced into the games as a composite contest consisting of ten events in track and field, in order to draw additional participants. In modern times, efforts are made to induce entries by awarding prizes not only for the winner but for second and third places. In horse racing, money can be wagered on a horse to win, place or show.

Individual fleet championships have doubtful value as a means of motivating a group of men. An individual training for a particular event may neglect his work to such an extent that he becomes a burden upon his shipmates. There is always the possibility the man's sense of importance will become so great that he will be egotistical and unpopular. This discussion is not considering the values of Fleet Champions as a morale factor in a unit, since we are concerned only with individual competition as a means of motivation.

Individual fleet championships give a few men high status and indirectly reflect prestige upon the groups of which they are members. This in turn makes the groups feel important, thereby gaining some psychological benefits. Nevertheless, it is the writer's firm opinion that the same amount of time and effort which is expended in developing individual champions would be far more valuable to the Navy if it were spent on developing the abilities of larger groups of men.

Group Type of Competition

It is in this type of competition that the Navy finds its most useful means for motivation. A man who is not interes-

ted in self or individual competition will most likely put forth considerable effort for his gun crew to win a coveted "E" in Short Range Battle Practice. A student who is required to maintain certain academic standards in order to play on the team will frequently show a burst of academic ability that startles his instructors. Men will save fresh water and turn out lights to conserve fuel on a ship standing high in the engineering competition when they otherwise never would have become economy minded.

Group competition develops group interest.- A highly desirable feature of group competition is the development of group interest. When groups are given a task or mission to perform with the opportunity to excel and thereby gain prestige, such a task becomes a challenge to their ingenuity. The men individually and collectively will devise ways and means to accomplish the task with the greatest efficiency. Ideas on performance are advanced and discussed as to effectiveness under various conditions. Analyses are made of the strength and weakness of the competing groups. The entire group frequently will become intensely interested in ways and means to win the award.

This group interest is of particular value to the Navy in training large numbers of men. Interested men will learn more about material and operational characteristics of their equipment than could ever be taught in a class room. The superior and more intelligent men will instruct and assist the backward members of the group in order to bring the overall

performance of the team to a state of proficiency which will enable them to win the award.

The possibilities are unlimited for using group competition as a means of gaining men's interest in operating and maintaining complex equipment. This technique should be used to the fullest extent possible in the Navy.

Group competition develops cooperation. - Not only does group competition stimulate learning in professional subjects, but what is even more important, it develops teamwork. The flight deck of an operating carrier would be a nightmare without the smooth coordination of the flight deck crew. Every man, from the plane pushers to the landing signal officer, has an important part to play. Any failure by individuals in the group will lead to certain confusion if not to serious trouble or injuries. An example of group competition producing coordination among groups is an air operation of several carriers in formation. Each ship makes a strong bid to be first in completing the assigned operations and to be the first to haul down "fox" flag, indicating the task has been completed.

The development of team work in the Navy has not been overlooked; rather the means for getting coordination has not always been understood. Group competition is a forceful stimulus for developing team play among the members of groups performing a given task. Needless to say, all officers should use this method to the maximum extent practicable in routine drills.

Group competition in industry. - Group competition is utilized to some extent in industry by use of group wage plans. Bonuses are given to a group upon production of more than a fixed number of units, and the total bonus is distributed among the members of the group on some predetermined basis. It is difficult to determine what effects these group incentive plans have as a means of motivation through competition. Spriegel says in Principles of Business Organization:

In group incentive plans it is desirable that the group be small enough so that each member is able to see the direct results of his efforts. Group payments tend to promote cooperation and reduce clerical costs. In many cases group payments result in emergence of an unofficial leader who acts as the group spokesman and performs some unofficial supervisory duties.⁵

Optimum number of participants in group competition. -

There is some difference of opinion as to the optimum number of participants for obtaining maximum effectiveness in group competition. If there are too few participants, winning the competition has little prestige, while if there are too many the participants in the lower half lose interest. This may be well illustrated by an engineering competition among one hundred destroyers. The interest and enthusiasm of the crew of a destroyer moving from tenth to fifth place will be considerably more than that of the crew of a ship that has moved from seventy-fifth to seventieth in rank order of efficiency.

The fact that there are only eight teams in the National, American, and practically all other baseball leagues;

⁵William R. Spriegel, Principles of Business Organization (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946) p. 446.

the fact that there are nine football teams in the "Big Nine;" eight major teams in the Pacific Coast Conference; and six teams in the Ivy League, demonstrates that in practically all forms of team sports the number of participants is limited to ten or less. The limiting of participants to ten or less and six or more is too frequent to be without significance. It appears that to obtain maximum benefit from group competition the number of participants should be more than five and less than eleven.

The problem in the Navy of selecting the optimum number of participants for group competition is admittedly a difficult one from an administrative viewpoint. The problem varies from battleships, of which there are two in commission, to destroyers with over two hundred. One solution would be awarding a squadron "E" for the ship that stood one in the squadron, and an additional Navy "E" for the ship that stood one in the Navy. In a similar manner battle efficiency pennants, communications, gunnery, athletic, and other marks of distinction could be awarded.

Effectiveness of group competition in the Navy. -

It is the writer's firm conviction that there is no effective substitute for group competition as a means of motivating a peacetime Navy in the science of warfare. Few, if any, senior naval officers desire the return of the intensive group competition that existed in the late nineteen-twenties, with ships given a rank order rating and their standing presumably indicating their battle efficiency. Too frequently the captain's

fitness report depended upon how well his ship fared in the various forms of competition. Also, it must be admitted that competition tends to develop deceit among the participants. However, none of these objections are so serious that they cannot be overcome by good planning, careful supervision, and proper administration of the "deterrent theory of discipline" for those violators of the rules or spirit of the competition.

Conclusions

In summarizing the contents of this chapter, the following points are considered most significant:

1. Historically, competition in one form or another has always existed. The American way of life is based upon free opportunity to compete for social, economical, and physical rewards.
2. Studies in deceit have shown that competition tends to increase dishonesty among school children, even when competing for prizes in honesty. Studies indicate that competition tends to develop deceit among the participants.
3. Self competition is the best and healthiest form of competition and should be utilized to the maximum extent possible.
4. Some form of recognition is urgently needed for Navy men in the lower ranks. An award similar to the Army's "Combat Infantry Badge" should be made in the Navy for those individuals who are doing excellent work in their rates but have little opportunity to distinguish themselves or advance in rating.

5. Individual competition is the least desirable form of competition for motivating men, although this type does have some value for welfare and morale among a group.

6. Group competition provides the best means in the Navy of motivating large groups of men, particularly in the field of training.

7. Group competition can be utilized to great advantage in training inasmuch as it gains the interest of the men.

8. Group competition can be used as a powerful stimulus in developing team play among a group.

9. Too few participants in group competition lowers prestige for the winner, while too many participants causes lack of interest among those near the bottom. The optimum number appears to be not less than six nor more than ten.

10. Group competition in the Navy can be made to work effectively if properly administered and carefully supervised.

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